presented a case for stoic self-control over jealousy and not for free reign o f one's sexual impulses. Russell did indeed attack conventional moral ity, especially the "Christian abhorrence o f sex" , but suggested that sex ual liberty, in itself, is not necessarily good, but may prove to be the only way to preserve the institution o f marriage in the face o f the advance o f a scientific outlook. This is because marriage, for Russell, was really about parenthood, and since adultery is less harmful to the parental relationship than jealousy it ought to be tolerated. W hile M onk finds the success o f such views to be improbable, he nonetheless suggests that Marriage and Morals is the most important work written by Russell in the 1920s. Yet he also suggests that the book "contains, perhaps, more eccentric views than any other book Russell wrote" (Monk, 2: 104).
W hat puzzles M onk most about Marriage and Morals is that Russell devoted a chapter to eugenics and, moreover, explicitly advocated the sterilization o f the mentally "defective" . Eugenics originated in Britain and melded together three strands o f late-Victorian science: a hereditary theory o f population, the study o f population statistics, and a theory o f population regulation derived from population genetics.2 T he common aim, and perhaps only unifying belief behind eugenics, was the convic tion that it was possible to intervene in the reproduction o f the popula tion to biologically improve future generations. These included " neoMalthusian"-inspired measures, like promoting birth control amongst the poor, or reducing public funds needed for poor relief; "positive" eugenic measures, like encouraging the "fit" to breed more and only with other "fit" individuals; or " negative" eugenic measures, like decreas ing the fertility rate o f the "unfit" by either separating so-called de fectives from society, or preventing them breeding altogether through medical sterilization.3 M onk is amazed that a "defender o f individual 2 Richard Soloway, Demography and Degeneration: Eugenics and the Declining Birth rate in Twentieth-Century Britain (Chapel Hill, n c : U. o f North Carolina P., 1990). See also Geoffrey Searle, Eugenics and Politics in Britain 1900 -1914 (Leyden: Noordohf In ternational, 1976 .
3 Eugenists emphasized selective marriage and large families among the best stock as the path to social and racial improvement whereas neo-Malthusians stressed restriction rather than an increase o f births. Nevertheless, the two groups were in some respects allies against indiscriminate breeding. That alliance was shattered, however, by fears o f greatly reduced population levels resulting from World War I. See Richard Soloway, "Neo-Malthusians, Eugenists, and the Declining Birth-Rate in England, 1900 England, -1918 liberties against the power o f the State" could advocate that the State should be empowered forcibly to sterilise all those designated as "men tally deficient" by experts, and that this measure should be introduced in full knowledge o f the misuses to which it might be liable, because reducing the number o f "idiots, imbeciles and feeble-minded" people is a benefit to society that outweighs the dangers o f such misuse.
(Monk, 2:105) M onk's response to his own puzzlement and revulsion with Russell's views is to take recourse to a psychological treatment o f Russell's state o f mind in the 1920s. For M onk, Marriage and Morals reflected Russell's feelings about his relationship with his second wife, Dora, anxiety about his rights and responsibilities as a father, and-in order to bolster a theme that runs through both volumes o f M onk's biography-a product o f Russell's intense, life-long fear o f insanity. This may seem like a plausible explanation-it does at least acknowl edge Russell's interest in eugenics (an issue glossed over entirely by the other major biographies o f Russell4)-and M onk is certainly less psy chologically determinist than some o f Russell's other biographers.5 However, M onk's argument is not a very good explanation. First, M onk fails to account for the fact that neither Russell's views on marriage nor those on eugenics were a product o f his situation in the 1920s. In fact, they evolved steadily from the 1890s. Second, M onk ignores the fact that Russell came to embrace these positions as part o f an ongoing dialogue with the prevailing consensus o f his time. Indeed, what is entirely mis sing in M onk's account is the intellectual and cultural context to the ideas that Russell was promoting. W hen properly contextualized, how ever, the chapter on eugenics in Marriage and Morals, and its placement in a text on the reform o f marriage, were not eccentric for 1929. Rather, Russell's views were entirely consistent with the general framing o f sex ual ethics by progressive sex and moral reformers since the turn o f the 
century.
This is not to claim that Russell's challenging personal life with Dora in the later 1920s did not have an impact on the content or timing o f Marriage and Morals, or that anxiety about the history o f mental insta bility in his own family did not influence his views. Clearly, they did. But if we are to fully understand the shape o f Russell's arguments about marriage reform and the place o f eugenic discourse within them, we need to be attentive to more than just Russell's personal life: we need to contextualize Russell's views within the range o f possibilities o f his time, to place his views in the debates that were unfolding, and to see how his dialogue with other viewpoints advanced his own position. This article will attempt to do just this, by first outlining British eugenics and con textualizing Russell's own views within the continuum o f eugenic ideas between the 1890s and 1930s, and then explaining the place o f eugenic ideas within sex and marriage reform generally, and in Russell's Marriage and Morals in particular. Third and last, it will explore Russell's endorse ment o f the sterilization o f the unfit, and demonstrate, given the full context provided, the continued libertarian logic o f Russell's position. In sum, once the intellectual and cultural contexts o f the ideas presented in the book and Russell's other writings on eugenics and marriage in the 1920s are made apparent, the autobiographical element privileged by M onk can be put in its proper, subordinate place.
RUSSELL AND THE DEVELOPM ENT OF BRITISH EUGENICS
In the two decades prior to the First World War, a number o f British intellectuals expressed concern over a perceived demographic trend in Britain-the so-called "differential birth rate" , in which the poor repro duced much faster than the wealthy.6 This was feared because it was accompanied by a "rediscovery" o f the terrible physical and moral condi tion o f much o f the labouring poor, but especially o f the "submerged tenth" (or the "residuum"-the very lowest rung on the socio-economic hierarchy).7 After the majority o f working-class volunteers for the Brit ish forces in the Boer War (1899-1902) were found to be unfit for ser vice, the government struck a committee to determine if the population was facing progressive "racial degeneration" .8 Although the committees findings were ambiguous, and indeed suggested environmental factors were mostly to blame, the neo-Lamarckian understandings o f genetic inheritance expressed in the report mirrored those o f numerous early twentieth-century scientists and social reformers, many o f whom posited that urban environmental factors were causing the progressive decline o f the nation's "racial" stock.9 Conservatives and social Darwinists, in par ticular, posited that each generation reared in poor working-class urban crowding were successively more physically and mentally stunted. These traits were then passed on through " in-breeding" resulting in a " racially" inferior population.10 The long-term health o f the British "race" was thought endangered by Victorian social amelioration legislation that penalized " the fit for the sake o f the unfit" . Indeed, eugenists argued that public health and social reform initiatives, often heralded by the Victor ians as key measures o f progress, "have been based on the [wrong] as sumption that better environment meant race progress."11 In this view, class hierarchy and poverty were not social or economic problems but biological in origin.12
But eugenics was not merely a conservative backlash to social reform. Given the intellectual ferment among scientists about the applicability o f Darwinian biology at the turn o f the century, and the growing sense that Britain was in some w ay falling behind its European competitors, it is hardly surprising that attempts were made by intellectuals o f all political stripes to link the new science to national life, political action, and social reform.13 As Richard Soloway notes: "Eugenics permeated the thinking o f generations o f English men and women worried about the biological capacity o f their countrymen to cope with the myriad changes they saw confronting their old nation in a new century." 14 M any o f the progres sive intellectuals with whom Russell associated in the 1890s and early 1900s agreed that manipulation o f the social environment through "ra tional selection" could improve human conduct and thus help direct evolutionary change in a positive way. This view was expressed in an influential set o f pamphlets-"The New Tracts for the Times"-auth ored by many progressive acquaintances o f Russell. This explanation follows very closely the consensus o f mainline eugenists like Oxford pragmatist philosopher F. C. S. Schiller-"the ability in the lower classes always tends to be drafted o ff into the higher" 22-a maven o f the Eugenics Society, with whom Russell debated both logic and politics in the years prior to the Great War.23 That Russell and mainline eugenists would agree that the most intelli gent were more often found amongst the middle and upper classes is really not surprising: the idea came straight from Galton himself.24 Galtons view-that the vast majority o f material and intellectual accom plishments o f British society were the result o f successive generations o f highly talented individuals from upper-class families-had been the stated basis for forming the Eugenics Society in 1907, which was charged with both educating the public on the importance o f genetic inheritance, and with advocating public policy that would preserve the talents and energy o f the fit and prevent them from being swamped by the "resi duum" .25 * Given his own W hig pedigree and respect for mathematics, it is hardly surprising that Russell would have had considerable sympathy with Galtons arguments. In 1895 Russell had excitedly exclaimed to Alys that Galton "gets a numerical estimate o f the contribution o f each ances tor to heredity." 2,6 But rather than embracing social Darwinism and laissez faire political economy as did many others who took up Gal ton,27 Russell found in Galtons work the "preaching [of] Socialism as a method o f keeping up the breed-it is the best argument I know for Socialism." 28 Consequently, Russell consistently challenged the as sumptions o f conservative eugenists that there was a direct biological correlation between wealth and intelligence, even though he never did give up on his belief that individuals o f intellectual merit were dispro portionately found in the upper classes.29 Moreover, Russell's thoughts on marriage and child-rearing, from their earliest formulation, were always connected to his views on eugen ics and frequently carried a tinge o f the duty that he believed high social class and ability carried with them. In 1893 he wrote for Alys a short composition on "Die Ehe" ("Marriage"), which he described as a "little essay on the immorality o f not marrying if in any way above the average" (.Papers 1: 62). This essay, ostensibly on the difficulties facing independ ent, public-minded "new women" like Alys, suggested that the first ten years o f a woman's marriage ought to be given over to motherhood (rather than devoted to public service), since this would be repaid by a number o f offspring who could multiply that public service in the long term ("Die Ehe" , Papers 1: 69-71). Later, when arguing for the emanci pation o f women, Russell suggested the State should take on the role o f assisting parents financially in the education and maintenance o f chil dren in order that meritorious women would be able to both serve the public good and raise children.30 In 1907 he advocated direct payments from the State to desirable parents, a plan he mooted again-this time in the form o f scholarships for education paid to desirable parents-in 1928.31 Undesirable parents, on the other hand, ought to be discour aged from procreating, and no financial aid from the State provided to them to bring up their children.
Russell also surmised that part o f the reason for the demographic differential lay in the fact that only the upper and middle ranks o f society had sound knowledge o f birth control: "the better members o f Western communities limit their families and the worse do not; thus we have a grave source o f evil, produced, and presumably removable, by economic causes."32 W hile the middle and aristocratic classes had learned to have fewer children, the "feckless" and "ignorant" among the working classes continued to reproduce at an alarming rate.33 Through a combination o f better and more open access to birth control the more intelligent could be encouraged to breed more and the less intelligent to breed less, thereby reversing racial decline. Russell's commitment to making available birth-control information to the masses in the face o f government hostility was apparent in his consistent advocacy o f birthcontrol pioneers like Margaret Sanger and Marie Stopes throughout the 1920s. It needs to be stressed, however, that unlike many conservative eugenists, family limitation arguments for Russell were elements o f broader social reform, not the justification for the substitution o f social reform with eugenic proposals:
The birth-rate among the better sections o f society has declined in recent years because o f voluntary limitation o f families; and this in turn is due to the eco nomic disadvantages o f a large family. If these disadvantages were removed, the effect would cease with the cause. The problem then is essentially one o f eco nomic and social organization. (" Biology and Politics" [1908] , Papers 12: 375)
The Great War, and Russell's reconsideration o f liberalism during it, led to an evolution in Russell's thinking on marriage and the population question. Before 1914 Russell had remained within the progressive liberal fold; during the War he came to think liberalism outmoded. After all, liberalism had not prevented the catastrophe o f the Great War. Tradi tional liberalism, Russell came to argue, was too focused on economic self-interest, individualism and naïve faith in rationality. In the circum stances o f industrialized total war, Russell came to believe that human actions were driven by unconscious impulses. W ithin the capitalist sys tem, the possessive impulse ruled and led to economic injustice and wars o f aggression and greed. O nly the move to a democratic socialism could save western societies-a socialism based, not on Marxian principles, but on freedom o f conscience protected by a public commitment to civil liberties; economic and political democracy; and the acceptance o f a Marriage and Morals was thus part o f this continuing exegesis o f the need to reform society according to a more scientific outlook. In the book Russell presented a case for a new sexual morality and for better marital and sexual relationships. He did so by providing a synthesis o f historical and anthropological work on the institution o f marriage and the ideologies that created it.36 Russell posited that there were three distinct stages to the evolving conception o f marriage, all o f which were connected to the role o f the married couple in procreation: first, that which existed among uncivilized "savages" who did not know that hu man beings had human fathers; second, the development o f an early patriarchal system when men came to realize the facts o f paternity; and third, the era o f organized religion (predictably, Russell concentrated on the Judeo-Christian tradition), which introduced the idea that there was something impure and indecent about sex. T he discovery that men sired children gave them both power and a means to continue the memory o f their achievements after death. The subjection o f women to men was the only way to secure female virtue, deemed vital for both the continuation o f male egoism and the economic system that it entailed: namely the transfer o f wealth from father to son. Conventional marriage thus rested on an economic impulse-the father charged with the protection and rearing o f children wanted an assurance that he was caring only for his own-and on the religious impulse about the nature o f sex. The result o f these impulses was that the sexual fidelity o f the wife became en shrined as the most important factor in the institution o f marriage.
After exploring how and why the idea o f marriage developed as it did, Russell attacked the institution as a whole, arguing that religious super stitions were breaking down under the weight o f their own hypocrisy, that women were justifiably pushing for greater economic independence, and that the State was gradually relieving the father o f his parental duties through providing free education and welfare provisions for children. Consequently, the economic reasons for a wife's faithfulness were rapidly being removed, leaving only the outdated religious sanctions. Due to the development o f effective contraception, sex and procreation were now separated and the old concern with safeguarding biological paternity could be disregarded. Therefore the connection between sex and the institution o f marriage could also be dissolved. Russell concluded that the need now was for a new sexual ethic to fit the conditions o f modern society and to preserve the family. He argued that the family ought to be preserved in some amended form and that marriage ought to be re tained, but only in order to facilitate the raising o f children. I f the family is not preserved, Russell warned, the State will take more and more con trol o f the rearing o f children, with the result o f more virulent national istic indoctrination and a greater danger o f war. O nly under a world government-a consistent theme in Russell's social and political writing through the interwar years and beyond-should the State be allowed such power, because such a government could eliminate the dangers o f militarist nationalism that Russell concluded had led to the First World War.
Recognizing how distant the world was from a single government, Russell's practical alternative for the meantime was a new morality o f marriage premissed on the removal o f the taboo on sex knowledge, on the minimum o f social or legal interference with love-allowing for companionate or trial marriage until procreation occurred-and on the application o f rational thinking to parental unions. Healthy adults should be free to love and live with whomever they pleased, in relation ships that did not require social, religious or legal sanction. Only the arrival o f children necessarily complicated such relationships, and only then should the relationship o f adults be considered binding, and again, then only for the benefit o f the relationship's offspring. It was in order to maintain a healthy environment for children-one free o f parental dis-cord-that Russell proposed his most controversial contention, that extra-marital sex was more desirable than the psychological damage to children that came with parental fighting and divorce. For the sake o f the children within the union, Russell therefore advocated control o f jealousy rather than o f sexual desires:
The doctrine that I wish to preach is not one o f licence; it involves nearly as much self-control as is involved in the conventional doctrine. But self-control will be applied more to abstaining from interference with the freedom o f others than to restraining one's own freedom.37 W hile Russell's conception in Marriage and Morals was characteristi cally bold and presented in engaging prose, it was neither unique to his pen, nor a new conception. It is, in fact, largely the exegesis and syn thesis o f views that had been evolving since the 1890s, with a few Russel lian twists that were more the product o f Russell's experience o f the First World War than o f his dysfunctional "modern" marriage with Dora. 
Progressive calls for the harmonious cooperation between the sexes for the good o f all society tended to be drowned out by the fury o f the de bates over women's enfranchisement before 1914. Russell stood as a women's suffrage candidate in 1907, but soon after moved to a position that embraced complete adult suffrage for the benefit o f all society, the latter position more common to mutualists than to feminists.46 As with other mutualists, in 1906 Russell argued "equality in marriage is more important than equality in any other relation; for marriage is the most intimate o f all relations." 47 After the First World War, the mutualist cause gradually achieved ascendancy amongst progressives in British society Although there were conspicuous differences between sexual libertarians on the one hand, and Christian mutualists and femin ists with roots in the social purity movement on the other, there was nevertheless a widespread agreement amongst leading intellectuals by about 1930 that the artificial segregation o f men and women was un healthy, and that patriarchal marriages and sexual ignorance had no place in a "modern" society.48 But the freedom to chose marriage part ners regardless o f the dictates o f respectability, religion or other social sanction was a key demand for mutualists which also implied a profound responsibility for prospective parents. Indeed, mutualist reformers ex plicitly connected their programme o f reform with eugenist argu ments-most particularly the duty to mate in the best interests o f the race . 49 Sir Alexander Morris Carr Saunders (1886-1966) was recognized as the leading British authority on population in the first half o f the twentieth century. He served as much to alleviate Russell's anxiety over differential birth rates. Russell commented in his chapter on population that the birth rates in different classes were now converging: "the birth-rate is still higher among the poor than among the well-to-do, but it is lower now in the poorest boroughs o f London than it was ten years ago in the richest" (p. 194; M M y p. 159). This convergence was due to the increasingly widespread use o f contraceptives, although it was still the case that "stupid people" because o f their limited access to birth control had larger families, and when they did try to limit family size it was through abortion (p. 203; M M y p. 166). Russell argued that there was no need in England (or western Europe) for more population growth, as the population density was high enough, and suggested those that seek increased population growth do so for militaristic and nationalistic reasons. In a typically pithy comment aimed at social conservatives and both those feminists and anti-feminists who opposed birth control, Russell averred: "the position o f these people is that it is better to restrict population by death on the battlefield than by contraceptives" (p. 195; M M y p. 160). But while the birth differential within Britain was declining, this develop ment suggested another possibility, equally frightening to intellectuals like Russell: "It may easily go on until the population begins to dimin ish, and the ultimate result may, for aught we can tell, be a virtual extinction o f the most civilized races" (p. Alys Russell was an early advocate o f "guiding" the working-classes in maternal care, and she had been responsible for setting up the first Brit ish School for Mothers at St. Paneras in 1907. At this clinic, advice was provided to working-class mothers on the feeding and proper care o f their children, along with "prescription feeding" , the gathering o f statis tical evidence on the infants seen, and the provision o f medical care. Similar clinics sprang up all over the country, a process accelerated by the Great War: by 1920, there were 1,583 o f them.51 On the face o f it, such institutions might be thought to be concerned strictly with infant "nurture" , but, in fact, they and a whole host o f other pro-natalist and infant welfare initiatives have been shown to have been underpinned by middle-class and elite fears o f racial decline.52 T he rhetoric o f " racial motherhood" bolstered ideas about mutuality and was widely taken up before and during the Great War. By 1917, surveys in Britain indicated that the three main reasons given for the importance o f marriage were mutual comfort and support, the maintenance o f social purity, and racial reproduction. 53 Indeed, the idealization o f motherhood and appropriate marriage practices were consistently at the core o f eugenic discourse in the first three decades o f the century. As pioneering mutualist sexologist Have lock Ellis put it: "Women's function in life can never be the same as man's, i f only because women are the mothers o f the race ... the most vital problem before our civilisation today is the problem o f mother hood, the question o f creating human beings best suited for modern life." 54 Ellis connected marriage, social reform and eugenics in his con cern to move society's concentration from the problems o f production to the problems o f reproduction; to, in his words, "the regulation o f sexual selection between stocks and individuals as the prime condition o f life." 55 The problem was how to induce in the population a sense o f 51 "sexual responsibility" about natural selection, so as to ensure "racial" progress. For Ellis and other mutualists, a new sense o f citizenship based on the rational planning o f sexual behaviour was advocated, combined with the belief that science could improve the quality o f the population. H. G. Wells argued that free love unions (by which he meant monog amous relationships based on love rather than religious or State sanction) would boost the birth rate-a transparent appeal to conservatives and eugenists who feared the differential birthrate-and Wells went so far to argue that "physical love without children is a little weak, timorous" even "more than a little shameful" ;56 but Wells also wanted women who reared fit and healthy children to be rewarded by the State.57 Still, the growing emphasis on the maternal function o f the female partner in marriage posed somewhat o f a dilemma for sex reformers. For mutualists, sex was not just about procreation (or individual gratifica tion), but also rather about harmony, unity and concord between man and woman. Ellis, for instance, wanted a reformed sexuality based on the exchange o f intimacies.58 Ellis was not trying to have it both ways: the rise o f eugenic thinking and maternalism gave scientific justification to progressive mutualist ideas about sexuality. It had been the virtual ab sence o f a respectable discourse on sexual intimacy during most o f the nineteenth century that had given mutualist arguments about marriage reform at the end o f the century their originality and moral force.59 Public commentary in the nineteenth century had presented sexuality primarily as a problem or a danger.60 By arguing that Victorian sexual mores had removed the element o f natural sexual selection in human mating, thereby weakening the British race, Ellis, Wells and George Bernard Shaw could call for a new ethics, promising sexual liberation as a means to national and racial regeneration.61 T he institution o f mar- riage itself was pointed to as an impediment to good breeding and " race regeneration" since the Victorian conception o f marriage placed prop erty, respectability, class and religion ahead o f race reproduction-the proper concern from a eugenic perspective. Given that eugenics was thought o f as the science o f human breeding, it really should be unsurprising that progressive sex and marriage re formers felt the need to take eugenic ideas seriously Karl Pearson argued that Victorian sexual morals led to a deformation o f natural "sexual selection" . Science could bring social advancement but this required freer and more equal marriage relations between men and women.62 Ellis even suggested that sexual attraction was essentially eugenic, and the substitution o f sexual attraction for traditional morality was fre quently dysgenic.63 Feminist psychologist Stella Browne advocated free love using eugenic arguments, arguing that monogamous unions based on mutual affection, equality and "sexual compatibility" were an ex ample o f a higher morality, based as much in science as social values.64 Mutualists supported the idea o f sex education in the hope that an edu cated population would engage in eugenic relationships without State intervention. The early campaign for family planning in the interwar years witnessed eugenics-minded doctors and scientists in Great Britain and the United States trying to find the perfect contraceptive, as the eugenic benefits o f birth control fascinated many biologists, geneticists, and charitable foundations.65 The involvement o f prominent feminists like M ary Scharlieb, Elizabeth Sloan Chesser, Catherine Gasquoine Hartley, Olive Schreiner and Stella Browne in the eugenics movement in the early twentieth century was also an attempt to shape programmes o f action on eugenic principles along feminist lines that would help the advancement o f women.66 W hile the otherwise socially conservative Marie Stopes was frequently attacked for her theories on eugenics-in her wartime play, The Race, she advocated the union o f unwed women with healthy soldiers, so that the British race did not lose its healthy stock i f the soldiers were killed67-the cornerstone o f the mothers' cli nic movement she founded was her commitment to understanding the sexual and fertility problems women encountered that could be allevi ated through access to birth control. 68 In fact, during the 1920s many feminists used the concept o f popula tion quality to gain support for birth control, and reciprocated by pub licly endorsing proposals for the voluntary sterilization o f mentally "de fective" individuals.69 Eugenics provided the ideal creed for many o f the "New Women" o f the early twentieth century, as it gave scientific credence to their views on human sexuality. And since mutualists aimed to create "N ew M en" to partner the new women, mutualists tended to embrace eugenics wholeheartedly.
EUGENICS AND SEX REFORM IN " MARRIAGE AND M O RALS"

Russell devoted two chapters (roughly ten percent o f the book) to eugenics and related issues in
Russell too came to view sexual liberation as tied to national progress, a view he first made explicit in a somewhat different context in Russell accepted that motherhood remained womens primary role, but he also suggested that the State should help mothers with child-rearing. By 1929 Russell was not only advocating that married mothers should get help from the State, on eugenic grounds, but unmarried mothers, too (p. 168; M M , p. 138). This view mirrored that o f George Bernard Shaw, who in Getting M arried in 1913 had argued that society should "prefer one healthy illegitimate child to ten rickety legitimate ones."71 Moreover, as Russell came to write Marriage and Morals, his views on the applicability o f Galton's ideas had softened and taken a less biologi cally determinist slant: "... I am quite convinced that family tradition plays a very considerable part in the phenomena which Galton and his disciples attribute to heredity" (p. 147; M M y p. 121). By the late 1920s, in fact, Russell's views perched uneasily between biological determinism and social and environmental constructivism, typified in his essentially utilitarian views on the what to do about the " feeble-minded" .
RUSSELL AND THE STERILIZATION OF THE " FE E B L E -M IN D E D "
M onk fails to recognize that by supporting the sterilization o f the "feeble-minded" Russell had not given up his role as defender o f the individual against the power o f the State, but rather sought to defend the individual's citizenship and freedom o f expression, given the likely devel opments in the relationship between the biological sciences and the State: developments he could see already being played-out in 1920s Brit ain. In fact, Russell advocated a sterilization programme as a way o f maximizing the possibilities o f individual rights given the increasing likelihood o f the State using scientific experts to determine biologically defective individuals. In preferring sterilization to institutionalization, Russell was deploying cold utilitarian logic to the problem o f the use o f science by the State. To explain how and why he came to this position For the entirety o f the period under discussion there was no clinical definition o f " feeble-mindedness" ; rather it was asserted with varying levels o f confidence that the feeble-minded made up the bottom ten per cent o f the population on any "standard" intelligence scale. The Edwardians defined the " feeble-minded" as those individuals who, due to innately low intellectual capacity, lacked the ability to perform "duties as a member o f society in the position o f life to which he is born" .72 The "problem o f feeble-mindedness" was first raised in British official circles in the Royal Commission on the Care and Control o f the FeebleMinded in September 1904, a reaction to the unpalatable social facts thrown up by the recruitment efforts o f the Boer War. Expert witnesses testified to the commission that a shockingly large number o f "defec tives" were not adequately dealt with by existing legislation and social infrastructure; that the weight o f evidence suggested mental deficiency was inheritable; that the feeble-minded were abnormally fecund and prolific (that feeble-minded women, in particular, were promiscuous and oversexed); and that the feeble-minded as a group were implicated in most o f the pressing social problems that afflicted Edwardian society.
In fact, much o f the early twentieth-century discussion o f feeble mindedness was based on a variety o f prejudices.73 Unwed mothers among the working classes, for instance, were often suspected o f being feeble-minded because o f their situation; it was assumed (incorrectly) that the feeble-minded were more prone to promiscuous lifestyles and large numbers o f illegitimate births. The commissioners tried to disen tangle prejudice from science, but the commission's Report concluded that the threat posed by the feeble-minded to British society was indeed serious and had potentially calamitous consequences for the genetic quality o f the population.74 The Report's conclusions became fodder for the Committee on Poor Law Reform o f 1910, which contains many eugenist pedigree charts purporting to prove the hereditary basis o f the feeble-minded and the connection between their mental state and their pauperism.75 More significantly, the report was the basis for the 1913 Mental Deficiency Act, which moved to permanently segregate the feeble-minded from society by housing them in special institutions on the certification o f two medical doctors. 76 In practice, only a small per centage o f the number o f feeble-minded believed to live in Britain were subjected to this legislation, because the Act had significant and worri some consequences. In effect it suspended the political and civic liberties o f those subject to its provisions, thereby effectively creating a biological definition o f citizenship in which only those deemed mentally fit were entitled to basic civil and political rights. T he problem o f protecting the rights o f the mentally deficient was thereafter frequently at the forefront o f debates about the segregation or sterilization o f the feeble-minded. 77 W hile segregation was thus enacted in a limited way in Britain, many health experts, and especially eugenists, argued that this was insufficient: that given the inherited nature o f feeble-mindedness, it would be a boon to humankind if hereditary feeble-mindedness were eliminated alto gether through a programme o f involuntary sterilization. This position was bolstered by American studies o f family pedigrees like those o f Henry H. Goddard, whose The Kallikak Family (1912) and Feehle-Mindedness: Its Causes and Consequences (1914) were based on Goddard's observations while Principal at the Vineland Training School in New Jersey.78 Goddard's studies were popularized in Britain by respected geneticists like William Bateson,79 which gave them more scientific validity than they perhaps deserved, because Goddard claimed to base his study on the newly rediscovered Mendelian genetic principles that Bateson himself championed in Britain. Indeed, Goddard's work carried a surprising amount o f authority until the late 1930s, despite serious methodological problems that were identified and published in early re views.80 Early twentieth-century scientists soon divided into three groups on the issue o f feeble-mindedness: the majority who agreed en tirely with Goddards theory; another, smaller group, who agreed with his general conclusions but were less sure about the details; and the smallest group, those who recognized the theory's problems and tried to argue against it.81 Goddard's theory became a touchstone in public debates about feeble-mindedness and a major prop for those advocating sterilization programmes, particularly for those within the British Eugen ics Society. 82 After the First World War, a campaign for the voluntary sterilization o f the mentally defective was urged by an alliance o f doctors, scientists and politicians, and relentlessly lobbied for by the Eugenics Society.83 Calls for voluntary sterilization came from across the political spectrum: liberals and progressives like С. P. Blacker and Julian Huxley, both key figures in the Eugenics Society in the interwar years, sought to make available to the poor (at State expense) the same procedure already avail able to the middle class. Blacker went as far to maintain that there was a demand for sterilization amongst the non-segregated mentally deficient themselves: "there are large numbers o f people who do not want large families, especially those in the lower grades o f society who cannot afford to bring up a number o f children. The motive which lead these people to undergo sterilization is the desire to limit children." 84 Conservative advocates o f the measure, like pioneering geneticist R. A. Fisher, had a more fundamentally ideological rationale: conservatives in the Eugenics Society spent most o f the interwar years putting together extensive pedi gree charts that purported to prove the connection between feeble-mind edness and pauperism and other social ills. They explicitly sought a biological solution to ongoing social problems. Despite their political differences, all found common cause in the Eugenics Society, and as a result o f the Society's determined lobbying, the Conservative Govern ment formed the 1924 Wood Committee in order to ascertain the num ber o f mental defectives in Britain, i f the number was increasing, and what should be done about the situation.
The Wood Committee reported its findings in 1929. Unsurprisingly, given that it was stacked with experts o f eugenist tendencies, the com mittee concluded that the problem o f feeble-mindedness remained great est in the lowest levels o f the socio-economic scale, and that the best way to deal with the problem would be through a voluntary sterilization pro gramme.85 W hat "voluntary" would have meant in practice is highly debatable, but on the basis o f the Committee's findings, the Eugenics Society formed a Committee for Legalizing Eugenic Sterilization and drafted a private member's bill that was introduced to Parliament in 1931 by Labour Party m p С. P Church. Despite the best propaganda efforts o f the Eugenics Society, the bill was viewed as fundamentally anti-work ing class by its opponents. Despite the eminence o f the scientists sup porting the bill, the opposition argued the science was biased, not due to any inherent methodological problems (although there were in fact plenty o f those), but because it seemed to propose draconian measures concentrated on a single-class o f citizens: the lower rungs o f the working classes. The Catholic Church, trade union and working-class leadership, and professional municipal health and social workers (the latter having their own vested interest in denying anything but environmental causes to social problems) protested vigorously, and the request to introduce the bill was defeated 167 votes to 89.86 Undaunted, the Eugenics Soci ety continued to press for legislation throughout the 1930s, and secured the appointment o f another government Committee on Sterilization, headed by Sir Laurence Brock, which reported in the late 1930s.
We know from his correspondence and journalism that Russell fol lowed the Eugenic Society's campaign and the very public discussions over voluntary sterilization in the 1920s; indeed, he was personally ac quainted with many o f the key protagonists. In his articles, Russell typi cally fell between radical progressives who argued that nurture was all when it came to human abilities, and conservative eugenists that argued for the unyielding governance o f nature. Russell consistently argued that both environment and heredity had to be considered when seeking the origins o f intellectual ability.87 But when it came to feeble-mindedness, Russell accepted the position o f geneticists like Julian Huxley and J. B. S. Haldane who themselves followed Bateson and Goddard in believing that feeble-mindedness was solely hereditary. As Russell stated in 1927, When feeble-minded persons marry normal persons a large proportion o f their children, though not all, are normal; but if two feeble-minded people marry their children will, on the average, be still more feeble-minded.88
This characterization was precisely that o f Goddard's flawed pedigree charts. Russell allowed this premiss to guide his relentless logic: as feeble mindedness could not be cured, and the afflicted tended to have more children than other people (a conclusion o f the Royal Commission), it would be better to deal with the problem directly rather than to let the feeble-minded have more children. But even so, why did Russell side with those progressives who preferred the sterilization option to institu tional separation?
The answer lay in the fact that since the passing o f the Mental Health Act in 1913, progressives had worried about the deprivation o f civic and political rights that followed from the institutionalization o f the feeble minded. But once sterilized the vast majority o f the feeble-minded would no longer need institutionalization and could therefore regain both liberty and their civic rights. Russell him self went further, and pro phesied that since the definition o f feeble-mindedness was so ill defined and elastic, it was practicably inevitable that governments would abuse the right to define someone as feeble-minded. He reasoned that because the State would try to police social and moral normalcy and political ac ceptability by having medical experts pronounce on suspect individuals' mental health, there was less danger to society in the State having the power to sterilize than there was in it having the right to compulsorily segregate the " unfit" .
In his 1927 article, "Should We Let the Scientists Govern?" , Russell pursued his argument to its logical limits. Echoing a theme found in many o f his interwar pieces, Russell suggested that many humans abstain from actions that would be to their collective advantage through "ignor ance, prejudice, short-sightedness and mere laziness" . Dealing with the problem o f feeble-mindedness was one o f these circumstances. As Russell wrote:
By sterilizing the feeble-minded o f two generations, feeble-mindedness and idiocy could be almost stamped out; but here religious scruples intervene, and even humanitarian feelings which lead to the opinion that one man must be made to suffer for the good o f others except as a punishment for sin. Scientifi cally-minded people naturally grow impatient o f these restrictions upon their activities.
But, significantly, Russell was cautious about the scientifically minded, too, for they were "not so objective in their judgments as they like to pretend" and went on to argue against aristocratic utopias-even those based on science. For Russell, despite its imperfections, only democracy was a sure way to justice.89
Russell continued that individualists rightly feared doctors abusing their powers, for as long as IQ could not be measured precisely there was always a danger o f prejudice coming into their decisions. But it was this very imprecision and the possibility o f the abuse o f power latent in auth ority to designate someone as unfit for political or other reasons that caused Russell to prefer sterilization to any other means o f dealing with the issue:
To shut up political opponents in a lunatic asylum would be to inflict a very severe punishment, and one, moreover, which a certain kind o f government might find tempting; but to sterilize a man without stopping his work would be a rather slight judgment, and in no way useful to the holders o f power.
Thus, it would be better to have a policy o f sterilization for all those designated feeble-minded by the authorities while also limiting the State's power to silence those who, for whatever reason, it deemed " un fit" .90 Sterilization thus offered a means to tackle a eugenic problem without extending the State's powers that it might be tempted to abuse.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps it is because Ray M onk judges Russell's social commentary as essentially worthless that he seems to believe it unnecessary to explore the full social and cultural context o f Russell's non-philosophical writ ings. W hen properly contextualized, however, the place o f eugenics within Marriage and Morals, and Russell's general concern with parent hood and for companionship in marriage, combined with his respect for sexual freedom in the book, are neither eccentric, nor the result o f uniquely personal circumstances or o f psychological demons. Rather, these views were largely consistent with the general framing o f sexual ethics by progressive sex and moral reformers since the turn o f the twen tieth century, almost all o f whom supported directly, or used, eugenic arguments in their calls for moral and sexual reform. M onk is guilty o f ascribing to Russell views which he sees as inconsistent in today's world, rather than what was seen as perfectly compatible in the early twentieth century. And it is instructive to note that o f the more than n o reviews o f Marriage and Morals that were published in 1929 and the early 'thirties, 9° "The Babies Nobody Wants" , p. 3.
some o f which were very hostile, not one commented in a negative fashion on Russell's eugenic arguments. T he issue o f eugenics only starts to be commented on negatively in reviews o f later editions in the 1950s; after, that is, the Nazi horrors had been revealed. Similarly, while M onk's revulsion over Russell's views on eugenics is quite understandable, this nonetheless reflects a late twentieth-century perspective, and fails to investigate both the evolution o f his position and the subtle distinctions that he made in his arguments. Russell never abandoned his libertarian concerns due to psychological fears o f hered itary mental deficiency; in fact, in many ways he tried to preserve what he saw as key individual liberties given his perception o f the increasing reliance on scientific authority by the State. We may disagree with his choices. On the face o f it, there were some curious lapses in his reason ing. For instance, Russell rather uncritically accepted arguments about the hereditary nature o f feeble-mindedness even though he acknowl edged that there was no consensus on what made one feeble-minded. Similarly, he accepted the connections between the hereditary nature o f genius and high social status suggested by Galton. But, o f course, Russell was not a geneticist himself, and his own experience and family history probably inclined him to accept what was, after all, the consensus view o f a majority o f respectable scientists (of all political persuasions) who were more acquainted with the cutting-edge o f genetics. From the turn o f the century to the 1930s, eugenics was not just a movement popular on the political right, as is often assumed, but was a respectable position among a variety o f Marxists, socialists, and Fabians: J. B. S. Haldane, G. B. Shaw, Havelock Ellis, H. J. Laski, Emma Goldman, С. P. Snow and Julian Huxley were only a few o f the radical left-leaning thinkers who, sharing beliefs in the need for some form o f a socialist social re engineering to overcome inequality, saw eugenics as a promising possi bility for progress and human liberation.91 Indeed, for many British intellectuals across the political spectrum, eugenic views were attractive because Victorian social reform strategies seemed to have failed, or were at least insufficient by themselves, to bring about great improvements in society. Eugenics provided a " modem" way o f talking about social prob lems that could be selectively appropriated by individuals and groups with very different goals and beliefs. Thus in different ways, eugenics gave scientific authority to both progressive agendas for social change and to conservative social fears and moral panics. For good or ill, the language o f eugenics lent respectability to prescriptive claims about the social order, and a patina o f objectivity grounded in the supposed work ings o f nature. 92 The fact that the scientific consensus on eugenics was unpopular with much i f not most o f British lay opinion-on religious and political rather than scientific grounds-perhaps also appealed to Russell's contrarian instincts. The fact that one o f the most active oppo nents o f eugenics in Britain was the Catholic Church certainly was not conducive to changing Russell's mind on the ultimate worth o f the eugenic idea.
Moreover, it is clear that as his thought on the topic evolved, Russell came to question many o f the premisses that underpinned much eugen ics research-especially in the interwar years-and he rejected what he saw as the dangerous ideological connections commonly made between biology and socio-economic status by the more conservative enthusiasts o f the Eugenics Society.93 Indeed, Russell's doubts about the feasibility and desirability o f eugenics increased over time, largely because o f the social and political arguments that tended to frame them.94 But like Julian Huxley and J. B. S. Haldane, Russell never gave up on the idea that if the ideological element could be removed from the application, the idea o f improving the overall human condition through biological manipulation was sound.95 And this is, after all, the premiss that un derpins much o f the more recent work in human genetics. The problem for Russell in the interwar years, however, was how to bring about the kind o f society-wide reforms he thought necessary without strengthening the power o f the State. The reforms o f marriage Russell proposed in 
